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Abstract
This paper presents a model of a small open economy that allows for international
labor mobility, thereby endogenizing migrant transfers or remittances. The result-
ing model is calibrated to the Philippine economy, of which labor migration and
remittance inflows are key forces that drive the economy’s growth. The model’s
impulse response functions illustrate that the presence of these features generates
a different set of dynamics from the standard small open economy model (without
labor mobility). Depending on the source of the shock, labor mobility and remit-
tances can either exacerbate or cushion the impact of the shock on the economy.
A temporary and unanticipated rise in the world interest rate leads to a drop in
aggregate output in the environment with labor mobility compared to one with-
out. In contrast, an adverse terms-of-trade shock of the same nature affects output
less severely in the case with labor mobility. Finally, a welfare cost compari-
son of different monetary regimes reveals that policies fostering flexible exchange
rates bring about welfare gains relative to a baseline policy of inflation targeting
that places a small weight on fixing the nominal exchange rate (otherwise known
as hybrid flexible inflation targeting). In particular, pegging the monetary base
proves to be welfare-superior to six other simple rules, namely: non-traded price
inflation, price-level, strict inflation, hybrid flexible inflation, exchange-rate, and
export-price targeting (of which the ranking follows the order of enumeration).
The ranking is preserved when labor mobility and remittances are absent in the
model.
Keywords: Small open economy, DSGE, monetary policy, remittances, labor
mobility, labor migration
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Mainly for the reason that it provides local workers access to higher-wage labor
markets, the phenomenon of international labor migration has grown significantly
especially in developing countries. In turn, remittances or private transfers that
might largely be motivated by a migrant worker’s existing family ties back home,
have become a major source of foreign earnings to these countries. IMF (2005) re-
ports that migrant transfers are now the second-largest source of external funding
for developing countries, following FDI. The largest source of remittances is the
United States and the two largest remittance-recipient regions are Latin America
and developing Asia. Given the magnitudes of these flows, the need to examine
their impact on the economy is readily apparent.
This study aims to build a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium (DSGE) model of a small open economy that reflects labor emigration
as practiced by many households in developing countries. Allowing for cross-
country labor mobility in this micro-founded set-up makes remittances endoge-
nously determined. There are a handful of DSGE models in the literature that
incorporate remittance channels. Among these models that treat remittances as an
1
exogenous shock are those of Durdu and Sayan (2008), Stepanyan and Tevosyan
(2008) and Punzi (2009). And though the models of Chami et al. (2006), Mandel-
man and Zlate (2008), Acosta et al. (2009) and Punzi (2009) treat remittances as
determined within the model, these same models are carried out in an environment
with flexible prices. This study then is the first to examine endogenous remittances
in an environment with price rigidities. The presence of nominal rigidities, in turn,
motivates the second goal of the study, which is the examination of various mone-
tary policies in this model environment. Appropriateness of alternative policies is
assessed based on a welfare cost measure obtained by following the methodology
of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007).
The model is calibrated to match moments of some Philippine data. Anal-
ysis is centered around the Philippine economy for a number of reasons. First,
the yearly outflow of Filipino workers of about 14% of the labor force makes
the Philippines the largest exporter of labor among Asian countries (Tan, 2006).
Based on 2007 data1, an estimated 8.72 million Filipinos reside overseas. This
figure corresponds to 9.8 percent of the Filipino population. Second, this coun-
try has been one of the largest remittance-recipients among developing countries.
For instance, the 2008 remittance2 figure that translates into 11.2 percent of GDP
places the Philippines in the top 4, only trailing behind India, China and Mexico
(Mohapatra et al., 2009). Third, migrant remittances have served as a major and
the least volatile source of the country’s foreign exchange (Burgess and Haksar,
2005). In fact, remittances to the Philippines already exceed FDI. Fourth, the
Philippines exemplifies a small open economy relative to the rest of the world.
Lastly, the analysis of different monetary policies becomes more relevant to the
2
Philippine economy with its shift from monetary to inflation targeting in Jan-
uary 2002 and the need to explore alternative monetary policies that are more
development-oriented, as expressed by Lim (2008).
The backbone of the model, i.e., before allowing for labor emigration and mi-
grant transfers, borrows heavily from the set-up of Devereux et al. (2006).3 Their
model is appropriate to the Philippine economy because it is tailored towards an
emerging market economy in two ways. First, the small open economy is subject
to external real interest rate and terms of trade shocks that are calibrated from
historical experience of Asian economies. The choice of shocks supports the lit-
erature on emerging market business cycles that emphasize the predominance of
external shocks in explaining aggregate fluctuations. Mendoza (1995) shows that
terms of trade shocks account for nearly one-half of actual GDP variability for a
group of developing countries that includes the Philippines. For a similar group of
emerging countries that also includes the Philippines, Uribe and Yue (2006) find
that US real interest rate shocks explain about 20% of movements in aggregate
activity. Second, the model allows for different degrees to which exchange rate
movements feed through to the domestic price level. Calvo and Reinhart (2002)
provide evidence that exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices is higher for
emerging, as compared to industrial, economies. Devereux and Yetman (2010)
estimate this value for the Philippines at 0.80 using 1970-2007 data. Similarly,
Webber (1999) and Sahminan (2002) both agree that the country has on aver-
age almost complete exchange rate pass-through into import prices. Hence, the
1The data is from the Commission of Filipinos Overseas.
2“Total remittances” refers to the sum of the 1) workers’ remittances, 2) compensation to em-
ployees, and 3) migrant transfers reported by each country. Data is available from the International
Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook.
3
benchmark model in this paper assumes that the economy faces a certain degree
of incomplete pass-through into imported goods prices.
Inclusion of labor migration and remittances into the micro-founded model
draws insights mainly from two papers - those of Mandelman and Zlate (2008)
and Nakanishi et al. (2009). To examine the effects of alternative immigration
policies, Mandelman and Zlate (2008) employ a two-country, real business cycle
model that allows for labor mobility from the foreign (Mexico) to the home (US)
economy. In line with their set-up, the small open economy model in this study
presents a worker whose decision to work in a foreign country depends on two
factors, namely: (1) foreign wages are higher than domestic wages at the steady
state and (2) there are costs incurred in leaving home to work abroad. Mandel-
man and Zlate (2008) refer to these costs as the sunk costs of emigration which
may include the costs of transportation, searching for employment, adjusting to
a new lifestyle, working visa procedures, and the physical and emotional risk of
being separated from family members and relatives, to name a few. In contrast
to Mandelman and Zlate (2008), the current model does not take into account
skill heterogeneity among workers and does not allow for a return of the immi-
grant worker to the home country, which is especially relevant during periods of
economic downturns in the foreign country.
Nakanishi et al. (2009), on one hand, examine the impact of remittances on
some macroeconomic variables under varying degrees of financial development
using a DSGE model calibrated to the Philippine economy. Like the framework of
3The model presented by Devereux et al. (2006) distinguishes finance-constrained en-
trepreneurs from ordinary households. The model in this paper makes a simplifying assumption
in that households and entrepreneurs are lumped as a single entity. That is, households own the
firms in the economy.
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Mandelman and Zlate (2008), their model envisions a household whose members
either work in the domestic or foreign country. The migrant worker then faces the
decision to channel his income on personal consumption in the foreign country
or as remittance to his family member back home. The foreign consumption of
the migrant worker, alongside the conventional domestic consumption, also enters
into the utility function of the representative household. These are features of the
Nakanishi et al. (2009) set-up that have been adopted to the model in this paper.
Welfare evaluation is drawn from the methodology proposed in Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2004, 2007) wherein second-order accurate equilibrium solutions to
the policy functions of the model are computed for a second-order approximation
of the welfare criterion. Acosta et al. (2009) and Devereux et al. (2006) also make
use of the same method to obtain a welfare cost measure.
The resulting sticky-price small open economy model with labor migration
and remittances generate economic decision-making dynamics that differ from an
economy where households do not receive additional income from remittances.
Depending on the source of the shock, these additional transfers can either cushion
or exacerbate the impact of the shock on the economy. It would have been ideal
to measure the gain or loss in welfare for an economy with labor mobility and
remittances relative to one without. However, the difference in the models’ utility
functions make it difficult to obtain such a welfare cost measure. Instead, we move
on to a welfare-cost comparison of alternative monetary policies and find that
this model environment favors a flexible exchange rate regime over a fixed one.
Specifically, we find that monetary targeting dominates the other simple monetary
rules that include inflation targeting. The welfare cost ranking also appears robust
5
to the absence of labor mobility and remittances.
The remainder of the paper is organized in five sections. Chapter 2 presents the
theoretical model. Chapter 3 describes the method of welfare cost of evaluation.
Chapter 4 details the empirical strategy. Chapter 5 presents a discussion of results
and chapter 6 presents the paper’s conclusion.
6
Chapter 2
Theoretical framework
We start with a small open economy with three domestic players - households,
firms and monetary authority. While households have access to international
and domestic capital markets, they also provide labor to domestic and foreign
firms. Migrant household members send remittances to family members in the
domestic economy from their foreign wages, after allocating for their own con-
sumption. Domestic household members channel their income to domestic con-
sumption, investment and payment of emigration costs, apart from interests on
domestic and foreign loans. In addition, they absorb final goods that comprise
imported and non-traded commodities. On the other hand, the economy has two
actively-producing sectors that respectively produce non-traded and exportable
goods. Two other sectors - importing and household absorption - simply serve to
combine different produce into one bundle. Lastly, there is a body that sets the
monetary policy of the economy.
The model economy features three sources of nominal rigidities. One orig-
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inates in the non-traded sector, where there is monopolistic competition among
identical firms and sluggish price adjustment a` la Rotemberg (1982). The other
is due to a household demand for money motivated by a cash-in-advance con-
straint in the purchase of domestic final goods. The third comes from introducing
a pseudo-firm that acts as a monopolistic domestic importer. This third feature
is incorporated to the model to make way for examination of varying degrees of
exchange rate pass-through into imported goods prices. The degree of exchange-
rate vulnerability is modeled as an adjustment cost of the same nature faced by the
firms in the non-traded sector. These elements create an incentive for the conduct
of monetary policy.
Furthermore, the model is augmented to incorporate habit formation in do-
mestic and foreign consumption. As Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2005) stress, habit
formation in the model allows for a smoother response of consumption to expan-
sionary shocks giving an impulse response that matches more closely to actual
data.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived households of mea-
sure one. We envision a household with two members, one who is bound to work
in the home and the other, in a foreign country. The representative household’s
preferences are described by the following utility function with habit formation:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU
(
CDt − %DCDt−1 , CFt − %FCFt−1 , HDt , HFt
)
, (2.1)
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where Et denotes the mathematical expectation conditional on information avail-
able in period t, CZt stands for consumption and HZt for labor effort, where Z
could meanD for domestic or F for foreign.4 At time t, households take as given
the process for CZt−1 . The parameter β ∈ (0, 1) denotes a subjective discount
factor while the parameter %Z ∈ (0, 1) represents the intensity of habit formation.
The single-period utility index U is assumed to be concave and smooth; increasing
in its first and second arguments and decreasing in its third and fourth arguments.
Specifically, the utility function takes the form:
U(·) = (CDt − %DCDt−1)
1−σD
1− σD +
(CFt − %FCFt−1)1−σF
1− σF − η
(HDt +HFt)
1+ψ
1 + ψ
,
(2.2)
where 1/σZ and 1/ψ are the intertemporal elasticities of substitution in consump-
tion and labor supply,5 respectively. η represents the disutility of labor.
Domestic consumption, CDt , is an index of the consumption of non-traded and
imported goods given by the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function:
CDt =
[
a
1
ρC
ρ−1
ρ
Nt
+ (1− a) 1ρC
ρ−1
ρ
Mt
] ρ
ρ−1
, where ρ ≥ 1 denotes the elasticity of
substitution between CNt and CMt and a ∈ [0, 1] can be interpreted as a measure
of openness.6
Domestic households have access to debt, Dt and Bt, that are, respectively,
denominated in foreign and domestic currencies. Trade in foreign loans is subject
4Arguments with a D (or F ) superscript represent the workings of the domestic (migrant)
household member.
5At the same time, 1/ψ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
6It can be shown that for ρ = 1, the CES function transforms into a Cobb-Douglas function, as
shown in Appendix A.2. Equivalently, 1− a is a measure of the degree of home bias.
9
to small portfolio adjustment costs. A household that borrows an amount Dt in
period t faces a portfolio adjustment cost of ψD
2
(Dt −D)2 (expressed in terms of
the domestic consumption good), where D is the nonstochastic steady state level
of debt. The household can borrow an amount Dt directly in terms of foreign
currency at a given interest rate of i∗t , or an amount Bt at an interest rate it.
In addition, domestic households in period t expect foreign-currency denomi-
nated remittances, Remitt, from the migrant household member. The amount of
remittances is determined after wage earnings are allocated to foreign consump-
tion, as given below.
Remitt = WFtHFt − CFt (2.3)
Equation (2.3) implicitly states that PFt is set to 1. WFt is hourly wage earnings,
assumed to be greater than the domestic real hourly wage rate, WDt, at every
period t, in this fashion: WFt =
1
νW
WDt
PDt
, where νW > 1. Also, migrant workers
that send an amount Remitt face a cost ψRem2 (Remitt −Remit)2 (also expressed
in the domestic good), where Remit is the nonstochastic steady state level of
remittances. Though such cost, like the portfolio adjustment cost, is added to
close the small open economy model as suggested by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2003), it may also represent fees charged by remittance service providers. In
practice, these remittance fees vary according to the amount of money sent. Upon
collection of the money, the receiver party also pays a certain amount of remittance
tax.
On one hand, households face a cost of emigration that is denominated as a
constant fraction, fe ∈ (0, 1), of the migrant worker’s period-by-period earnings,
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i.e., feWFtHFt . Apart from practical reasons, this cost is introduced so that de-
spite higher foreign wages, domestic labor supply will be greater than its foreign
counterpart in the steady state. Also, while this cost can be incorporated imme-
diately in (2.3), we opt to place it as a separate term in the consolidated budget
constraint below for computational reasons.
Moreover, households rent out capital stocks,KNt andKXt , to the non-traded
and export sectors, respectively. Correspondingly, they receive payments RNt and
RXt for a unit of these stocks from the firms in each sector. Capital stocks in both
sectors evolve according to
KNt+1 =
[
INt
KNt
− ψI
2
(
INt
KNt
− δ
)2]
KNt + (1− δ)KNt (2.4)
KXt+1 =
[
IXt
KXt
− ψI
2
(
IXt
KXt
− δ
)2]
KXt + (1− δ)KXt , (2.5)
where δ is the rate of capital depreciation, IXt and INt are investment in the two
sectors and ψI is an adjustment cost parameter. As per Devereux et al. (2006),
this adjustment cost of investment is introduced so that the marginal return to
investment in terms of capital goods is declining in the amount of investment
undertaken, relative to the current capital stock. Since investment in new capital
requires the same mix of goods as the domestic household’s consumption basket,
the nominal price of a unit of investment in either sector is PDt , the price index
corresponding to CDt .
Aside from loans, capital rent, and wages, households earn income from firm
dividends, Πt, and government transfers, Tt. Household earnings are then chan-
neled to consumption, investment, emigration fees, interest on loans, and portfolio
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adjustment and remittance costs payments. These monetary flows are consoli-
dated in the budget constraint of the representative household:7
PDt(CDt + INt + IXt) +Mt + StfeWFtHFt + (1 + i
∗
t−1)StDt−1
+ (1 + it−1)Bt−1 + PDt
ψD
2
(Dt −D)2 + PDt
ψRem
2
(Remitt −Remit)2
≤ WDtHDt +RNtKNt + RXtKXt +Mt−1 + StDt +Bt + StRemitt + Tt +Πt.
(2.6)
Such budget constraint is expressed in domestic currency, made possible through
the nominal exchange rate, St.
Equation (2.6) indicates that at the beginning of period t ≥ 0, the household
starts with money balances Mt−1 carried from the previous period and demands
money at the amount of Mt. This demand for money originates from a cash-in-
advance constraint of the form,
Mt ≥ νPDtCDt , (2.7)
where ν ≥ 0 is a parameter denoting the fraction of consumption expenditures
that must be backed with monetary assets.
Solving the household’s problem entails finding the set of stochastic processes
{CDt , CFt , HDt , HFt , Dt, Bt, Mt, INt , IXt , KNt+1 , KXt+1 , Remitt, λDt , λFt ,
ζt, QNt , QXt}∞t=0 that maximizes (2.1) subject to (2.3)-(2.7) and some borrowing
limit that prevents the household from engaging in Ponzi-type schemes, taking as
given the price sequences
{
PDt ,WDt , RNt , RXt , i
∗
t−1, it−1, St
}∞
t=0
and the initial
7Note that foreign consumption and wages are no longer included in (2.6) as they are already
implied in the remittance equation (2.3).
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conditions KN0 , KX0 , D−1, i
∗
−1, B−1, i−1, M−1, CF−1 , and CD−1 . We let β
tλFt ,
βtλDtQNt , βtλDtQXt , βtλDt and βtλDtζt denote, respectively, the Lagrange mul-
tipliers associated with (2.3), (2.4), (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7), respectively. Kindly
refer to Appendix A.1 for the detailed solution.
2.1.1 Optimal consumption and labor supply decisions
The first-order conditions corresponding to domestic consumption and labor sup-
ply are as follows, where λDt is the marginal utility of income.
λDt =
(CDt − %DCDt−1)−σD
PDt(1 + νζt)
(2.8)
η(HDt +HFt)
ϕ = λDtWDt (2.9)
We see from the above equations that domestic money holding distorts both the
labor-leisure choice and the intertemporal allocation of consumption. Correspond-
ingly, the household identifies the optimal mix of non-traded and imported goods
that will minimize her expenditures subject to the total supply of goods for do-
mestic consumption. Demand for these goods are represented by the following
expressions:
CNt = a
(
PNt
PDt
)−ρ
CDt
CMt = (1− a)
(
PNt
PDt
)−ρ
CDt ,
where the domestic price index is defined as PDt =
[
aP 1−ρNt + (1− a)P 1−ρMt
] 1
1−ρ .
PNt and PMt are the respective unit prices of non-traded and imported goods.
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Meanwhile, the optimal allocations attributed to foreign consumption and la-
bor supply (equations (2.10)-(2.11) below) imply that the unit of labor effort di-
rected abroad is determined by domestic labor supply and the purchasing ability
of the foreign wage rate, after accounting for emigration and remittance costs. In
this model, domestic and foreign labor supplies are highly substitutable.
(CFt − %FCFt−1)−σF = λDt [St − PDtψRem(Remitt −Remit)] (2.10)
η(HDt +HFt)
ϕ = λDtWFt [St(1− fe)− PDtψRem(Remitt −Remit)] (2.11)
The assumptions that WFt
PDt
>
WDt
PDt
and 0 < fe < 1 create the incentive to work
abroad at every t.
2.1.2 Money and bond holdings decisions
The associated first-order conditions for foreign and domestic bonds and money
holdings, respectively, are as follows:
StλDt
[
1− PDtψD(Dt −D)
St
]
= β(1 + i∗t )EtλDt+1St+1 (2.12)
λDt = β(1 + it)EtλDt+1 (2.13)
1
1− ζt = 1 + it. (2.14)
The left-hand side of equations (2.12) and (2.13) state that if the household decides
to borrow a unit today, current consumption increases by one unit (minus the
marginal portfolio adjustment cost for equation (2.12)). This increase in today’s
utility from extra consumption must be offset by the disutility from a decline in
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tomorrow’s consumption as income will then be channeled to debt repayment plus
interest, as conveyed by the right-hand side of these equations. Lastly, equation
(2.14) implies that the opportunity cost of holding money is equal to the gross
domestic interest rate.
2.1.3 Capital accumulation and investment decisions
Investment decisions lead to the following equations that implicitly state the in-
vestment demand from the two sectors.
QNt
[
1− ψI
(
INt
KNt
− δ
)]
= PDt (2.15)
QNt
[
1− ψI
(
INt
KNt
− δ
)]
= PDt (2.16)
QZt can be inferred as the shadow price of installed capital, or Tobin’s Q. At the
same time, solving for KZt+1 leads to the equation for QZt:
QNt = βEt
λDt+1
λDt
{
RNt+1 +QNt+1
[
(1− δ)− ψI
2
(
INt+1
KNt+1
− δ
)2
+ ψI
(
INt+1
KNt+1
− δ
)(
INt+1
KNt+1
)]}
,
(2.17)
QXt = βEt
λDt+1
λDt
{
RXt+1 +QXt+1
[
(1− δ)− ψI
2
(
IXt+1
KXt+1
− δ
)2
+ ψI
(
IXt+1
KXt+1
− δ
)(
IXt+1
KXt+1
)]}
.
(2.18)
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2.2 Firms
There are two actively producing sectors, the export and non-traded sectors. The
export sector is characterized by perfectly competitive firms, whereas firms in the
non-traded sector operate in a monopolistically competitive environment.
Two other sectors simply serve as packagers of commodities, without utilizing
household resources. Firms from the import sector buy goods from abroad and
repackage these goods for sale in the domestic economy. Another set of firms
wraps these imported goods together with the non-traded goods for household
absorption.
A detailed solution of the succeeding equations is presented in Appendix A.3.
2.2.1 Export sector
All goods ready for export are produced by identical firms using capital and labor
resources from households according to the following Cobb-Douglas production
function:
YXt = AXK
γ
Xt
H1−γXt , (2.19)
where AX is a productivity parameter and 0 < γ < 1 is the share of capital
expenditures to total firm revenues. The profit-maximizing firm’s demand for
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capital and labor inputs are then determined by the following equations:
RXtKXt = γPXtYXt (2.20)
WDtHXt = (1− γ)PXtYXt , (2.21)
where YXt is the quantity of export goods produced and PXt is the unit price of
these commodities. We assume that the law of one price holds for export goods
and thus, we have
PXt = StP
∗
Xt , (2.22)
with P ∗Xt as the unit price of the same commodity in foreign currency.
2.2.2 Non-traded sector
There is a continuum of identical firms in the non-traded sector that each produces
a differentiated good. The technology used by firm i ∈ [0, 1] to produce its own
variety of the non-traded good takes the form
YNt(i) = ANKNt(i)
αHNt(i)
1−α,
where AN and α are similarly defined as in (2.19). Firm i’s demand for capital
and labor inputs are determined after minimizing its expenditures subject to the
production of the desired amount of output. The implicit demand for the two
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inputs are provided by the following first-order conditions:
RNtKNt(i) = αMCNt(i)YNt(i)
WDtHNt(i) = (1− α)MCNt(i)YNt(i),
whereMCNt(i) is the nominal marginal cost faced by firm i.
Accordingly, firm i’s target output level, YNt(i), comes from consumers’ de-
mand for its differentiated good (refer to Appendix A.3.2), as described below:
YNt(i) =
(
PNt(i)
PNt
)−λ
YNt . (2.23)
The level of total demand for non-tradables, YNt , is a CES aggregate: YNt =[∫ 1
0
YNt(i)
λ−1
λ di
] λ
λ−1
. Parameter λ is the elasticity of substitution across varieties
of the non-traded good.
Able to produce its own variety of the non-traded good, firm i has the power to
set its price, PNt(i), in the market. A pricing constraint in the spirit of Rotemberg
(1982), however, is imposed to introduce nominal rigidity in the system. Hence,
in as much as the firm wants to increase its price to the optimum as a result of a
demand or marginal cost shock, it can only do so gradually as it is constrained by
this convex price adjustment cost.
To determine PNt(i), firm i maximizes the present discounted value of its
profits subject to the demand for its product, presented in equation (2.23). The
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objective function of the firm may be presented in the following manner:
Et
∞∑
k=0
Γt,t+k
{
PNt+k(i)YNt+k(i)−MCNt+k(i)YNt+k(i)
− PDt+k
ψPN
2
(
PNt+k(i)
PNt+k−1(i)
− 1
)2}
.
The stochastic discount factor, Γt,t+k, is defined as Γt,t+k = βt+kλDt+k .
Accordingly, the aggregate optimal price-setting equation adhered by all firms
in this sector is one that follows a dynamic adjustment process, as written below
after imposing firm symmetry (i.e., PNt(i) = PNt):
PNt =
λ
λ− 1MCNt −
ψPN
λ− 1
PDt
YNt
PNt
PNt−1
(
PNt
PNt−1
− 1
)
+
ψPN
λ− 1Et
[
Γt,t+1
Γt,t
PDt+1
YNt
PNt+1
PNt
(
PNt+1
PNt
− 1
)]
. (2.24)
Without adjustment costs, i.e., ψPN = 0, firms simply set the price as a mark-up
over marginal cost as monopolists do.
2.2.3 Import sector
To allow for the possibility of a delay in the adjustment of imported goods prices
to exchange rate movements, the behavior of firms in this sector is modeled in the
same fashion as that of the non-traded firms. That is, there is a continuum of do-
mestic monopolistic importers that also face a cost of price adjustment. Importer
firm i buys goods produced abroad at the price StPMt(i)∗ and sells to the home
market at PMt(i). Similar to (2.24), the movement of the imported goods price
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index can be written as
PMt =
λ
λ− 1StP
∗
Mt −
ψPM
λ− 1
PDt
TMt
PMt
PMt−1
(
PMt
PMt−1
− 1
)
+
ψPM
λ− 1Et
[
Γt,t+1
Γt,t
PDt+1
TMt
PMt+1
PMt
(
PMt+1
PMt
− 1
)]
, (2.25)
where TMt is the level of aggregate demand for imports by the domestic economy.
A higher value of ψPM implies a lower rate of exchange rate pass-through into
imported goods prices. On the other hand, complete pass-through (ψPM = 0)
denotes a firm setting its import price every period as a markup over the foreign
price. Following Devereux et al. (2006), we set P ∗Mt = 1. Hence, shocks to the
terms of trade feed into the economy through P ∗Xt .
2.2.4 Household absorption sector
Lastly, there is a firm that acts as a middleman between households and firms.
This firm simply collects nontraded and imported goods from domestic firms and
sells the resulting bundle to the households. The bundle, Yt, is again defined as a
CES aggregate:
Yt =
[
a
1
ρY
ρ−1
ρ
Nt
+ (1− a) 1ρT
ρ−1
ρ
Mt
] ρ
ρ−1
. (2.26)
Maximizing profits at every period t, the representative firm determines its opti-
mal demand for nontraded and imported goods from domestic firms as expressed
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below.
YNt = a
(
PNt
PDt
)−ρ
Yt (2.27)
TMt = (1− a)
(
PMt
PDt
)−ρ
Yt (2.28)
2.3 Monetary authority
Different monetary rules are considered and the associated welfare costs of busi-
ness cycles evaluated. In all the monetary policy rules enumerated below, it is as-
sumed that the central bank’s policy instrument is the nominal interest rate. Also,
the variables without t subscript appearing below refer to their non-stochastic
steady state values.
The first of such rules is strict inflation targeting. With this rule, that the
monetary authority only concerns itself with fluctuations in the rate of inflation.
This monetary policy is introduced to contrast the baseline policy which is of the
flexible type. Specifically, the central bank faces the following simple rule:
ln
(
1 + it
1 + i
)
= αpiD ln
(
piDt
piD
)
, (2.29)
where αpiD is the weight placed by the authority on targeting domestic inflation
piDt .
It was only in the first quarter of 2002 that Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP),
the Philippines’ central bank, implemented inflation targeting. Prior to this pe-
riod, BSP adhered a monetary targeting approach to monetary policy. It would be
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interesting then to examine the welfare cost/gain of giving up the previous mon-
etary policy for the current one. Hence, monetary targeting takes its place in the
set of alternative monetary rules and is modeled as equation (2.29) by replacing
the variable piD withM .
To mirror the behavior of the economy under flexible prices in the absence of
other distortions, we include a rule that aims to target inflation rate in the non-
traded goods prices. This monetary policy takes the liberty away from firms in
the non-traded sector to adjust their prices in response to a shock. Also, nominal
exchange rate targeting is included in the list of rules. However, since this model
assumes incomplete pass through, it would be no surprise that strict exchange rate
targeting would not bring about gains in welfare relative to the baseline policy.
This study also accommodates the proposal of Frankel (2005) of pegging
the export price index (PEPI) as an appropriate monetary policy for small open
economies. According to Frankel, pegging the export price index has the advan-
tage over CPI targeting in that the former is more robust to terms of trade shocks.
When the world price of exports deteriorates, such a monetary policy responds
indirectly through a domestic currency depreciation; CPI targeting does not. On
one hand, a rise in the price of the country’s imports would also make a domestic
currency depreciation desirable. Although neither of the two policies deliver the
desired result, CPI targeting implies a contractionary monetary policy that leads
to an appreciation of the domestic exchange rate against the dollar, whereas PEPI
at least promises no appreciation of the exchange rate.
Lastly, a policy that does price-level targeting through the CPI completes our
list of alternative monetary policies. Ball et al. (2005) and Gorodnichenko and
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Shapiro (2007) are among those in the literature that provide evidence of the ef-
ficacy of such monetary policy. Price-level targeting has the advantage over in-
flation targeting in that the former gives room for the policymaker to make up
for past mistakes. This regime is able to offset a temporary inflation shock by
bringing back the price level to its target, whereas there is no such offset under
inflation targeting. With inflation targeting, a temporary inflation shock leads to a
permanent shift in the time path of the price level, making the price level increas-
ingly difficult to predict as the forecast horizon increases. While the long-run
predictability of the price level under this alternative policy is the source of its ap-
peal, the same policy, however, has the propensity to raise the short-run variability
of both inflation and output (Ambler, 2009).
2.4 Equilibrium and aggregation
Going back to the non-traded sector to integrate the optimal behavior of the overall
set of identical firms leads to the following aggregate production technology and
demands for capital and labor:
YNt = ANK
α
NtH
1−α
Nt
(2.30)
RNtKNt = αMCNtYNt (2.31)
WDtHNt = (1− α)MCNtYNt . (2.32)
If we restrict attention to equilibria in which the nominal interest rate is strictly
positive, as we do in this paper, then the cash-in-advance constraint faced by
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households will always be binding (Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2007). Thus, the
aggregate household demand for money satisfies
Mt = νPDtCDt . (2.33)
The domestic labor market clearing condition states that
HDt = HNt +HXt . (2.34)
Finally, the economy’s current account equation is given by
(1 + i∗t−1)StDt−1 + feStWFtHFt = PXtYXt − StP ∗MtTMt + StDt + StRemitt,
(2.35)
where the derivation can be followed in Appendix A.4. In the process of deriving
(2.35) from (2.6), we assumed that Tt =Mt −Mt−1 + (1 + it−1)Bt−1 −Bt and
Yt = CDt + INt + IXt +
ψD
2
(Dt −D)2 + ψPM
2
(
PMt
PMt−1
− 1
)2
+
ψPN
2
(
PNt
PNt−1
− 1
)2
+
ψRem
2
(Remitt −Remit)2. (2.36)
A stationary competitive equilibrium is a set of stationary stochastic processes
{CDt , CFt , HDt , HFt , Dt, Bt, Mt, INt , IXt , KNt+1 , KXt+1 , Remitt, λt, ζt, QNt ,
QXt , PDt , WDt , RNt , RXt , YXt , Yt, YNt , PNt , TMt , PMt , St, HXt , HNt , MCNt ,
it}∞t=0 satisfying (2.3-2.5), (2.8-2.22), (2.24-2.36) given exogenous processes {i∗t ,
P ∗Xt}∞t=0 and initial conditions KN0 , KX0 , D−1, i∗−1, B−1, i−1, M−1, CF−1 , CD−1 ,
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PM−1 and PN−1 . Equilibrium under any of the monetary policy regimes discussed
can be defined in a similar manner by replacing (2.29) with the appropriate mon-
etary specification.
Other macroeconomic variables that are of interest in this paper are domestic
inflation rate, piDt , non-traded goods inflation rate, piNt , gross domestic product,
GDPt, real interest rate, rt, and the real exchange rate, RERt. Gross rates of
domestic and non-traded goods inflation are given by
piDt =
PDt
PDt−1
,
piNt =
PNt
PNt−1
.
Following Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2001), gross domestic product is expressed
as
GDPt =
PXtYXt + PNtYNt
PDt
,
which can be interpreted as the value of all goods produced within the economy
in terms of domestic final goods. The real interest rate is defined as
rt = it + 1− piDt .
Lastly, we follow Galı´ andMonacelli (2005) in defining the bilateral real exchange
rate as the ratio of the two countries price indices, expressed in the currency of the
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home economy, i.e.,
RERt =
StPFt
PDt
,
where we previously mentioned that PFt = 1.
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Chapter 3
Welfare evaluation
Policy evaluations are carried out by comparing welfare costs across different
monetary regimes. We follow the steps outlined by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2007) in deriving a welfare cost measure.
Conditional welfare associated with an alternative monetary policy, denoted
by a, is defined as
V a0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU
(
(C˜aDt)
1−σD
1− σD +
(C˜aFt)
1−σF
1− σF − η
(HaDt +H
a
Ft
)1+ψ
1 + ψ
)
,
where C˜aZt ≡ CaZt − ρZCaZt−1 and HaZt are the contingent plans for consumption
and labor under a particular policy. Similarly, we denote conditional welfare as-
sociated with the baseline monetary regime b by V b0 .
8
Conditional welfare cost then, denoted by c, is defined as the fraction of
8We note that at time 0, the economy is in the nonstochastic steady state of a competitive
equilibrium which is invariant across monetary regimes. This ensures that the economy begins
from the same initial point for all possible policies considered.
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regime b’s consumption stream that a consumer would freely give up to be indif-
ferent between the two regimes a and b. That is, c can derived from the following
equality:
V a0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU
(
[(1− c)C˜bDt ]1−σ
1− σ +
[(1− c)C˜bFt ]1−σ
1− σ − η
(HbDt +H
b
Ft
)1+ψ
1 + ψ
)
,
where we conveniently impose σ = σD = σF to facilitate a tractable derivation of
the welfare cost measure.
If we let V bH0 = E0
∑∞
t=0 β
t
(
η
(HbDt
+HbFt
)1+ψ
1+ψ
)
, then the previous equation
becomes
V a0 = (1− c)1−σE0
∞∑
t=0
βtU
(
(C˜bDt)
1−σ
1− σ +
(C˜bFt)
1−σ
1− σ
)
− V bH0 .
Yet, E0
∑∞
t=0 β
tU
(
(C˜bDt
)1−σ
1−σ +
(C˜bFt
)1−σ
1−σ
)
= V b0 + V
b
H0
. As a result, we have a
simplified expression for V a0 :
V a0 = (1− c)1−σ(V b0 + V bH0)− V bH0 .
Solving for c, we obtain
c = 1−
(
V a0 + V
b
H0
V b0 + V
b
H0
) 1
1−σ
.
For a second-order approximation of the welfare cost measure, refer to Appendix
B.
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Chapter 4
Model calibration and solution
The equilibrium dynamics of the model is estimated through a second-order ap-
proximation to the equilibrium conditions around the nonstochastic steady state.
The latest version of Dynare, a free software that runs in Matlab, is used to per-
form this routine. Since we are ultimately after welfare cost estimates in this study,
it is necessary to do a second-order approximation to account for the volatility ef-
fects on the mean levels of welfare.
The model, with respect to a baseline monetary policy specification, is cali-
brated to match moments of some macroeconomic variables for Philippine data
spanning the 2002:Q1-2009:Q3 period. Such a period is chosen because it is char-
acterized by a homogeneous inflation targeting regime, which is believed to be of
the flexible variety (Mariano and Villanueva, 2006). In particular, the baseline
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regime is modeled as a hybrid Taylor rule with the following specification:
ln
(
1 + it
1 + i
)
= αi ln
(
1 + it−1
1 + i
)
+ αpiD ln
(
piDt
piD
)
+ αS ln
(
St
S
)
+ αGDP ln
(
GDPt
GDP
)
.
Variables without t subscripts stand for their corresponding nonstochastic steady
state values. Together with the other parameters in the model, we search for pa-
rameter values to match simulated moments to empirical ones of some variables.
From the calibration exercise, the smoothing parameter αi is set to 0.84, which
agrees with the value for the optimized Taylor rule reported by Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2007). The parameters αpiD , αS and αGDP are assigned values of 1.6,
0.2 and 0.7, respectively. These values are fairly consistent with the Bayesian
estimates of Bautista (2009) for the Philippines using data for a similar period.
Table 4.1 presents a summary of the values assumed by the parameters in the
model. We follow Devereux et al. (2006) in setting the world real interest rate at
6% so that at the quarterly level, β = 0.985. The intensity of habit formation,
%D, takes on an upper bound to some emerging country estimates (see Uribe and
Yue, 2006; Haider and Khan, 2008, for comparison). This habit persistence value
must be consistent with a mid-range value for the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution, σD = σF . Quarterly depreciation rate is set to δ = 0.025 as in many
papers (Christiano et al., 2005; Acosta et al., 2009; Devereux et al., 2006). α and
γ take on values used by Devereux et al. (2006) which are inferred from Asian
data. Likewise, ρ takes on a value of unity following (Devereux et al., 2006). The
parameter λ is set so that steady state markup of prices over marginal cost in the
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non-traded sector is 10%, as practiced in the literature.
The parameter ϕ is set to 4, much higher than the unity value for Devereux
et al. (2006). This implies that the Frisch elasticity of domestic labor supply is
equal to 0.25. Such a value is consistent with the average estimates of uncompen-
sated labor supply elasticities for men and women obtained by Evers et al. (2008)
for a group of countries.9 The authors find that the mean elasticities for men and
women are 0.07 and 0.43, respectively. Moreover, 1/ϕ = 0.25 is close to the sim-
ple average of two labor elasticity estimates obtained for the Philippines. Bautista
(1973) concludes that Philippine manufacturing in 1961 is characterized by a uni-
tary elasticity of labor supply. Dessing (2002), on one hand, examines a 1975−76
data of rural households with low wage rates in the Philippines and arrives at a la-
bor supply elasticity of -0.554. The author’s paper also surveys a literature that
shows positive labor supply elasticities at higher levels of income.
Due to the difficulty of quantifying the economic cost of emigration, the pa-
rameter fe is calibrated so that the steady state hours worked in the home econ-
omy is 0.4, slightly higher than the steady state value of 0.2 for the case of the
U.S. economy (Prescott, 1986). The slightly higher steady state work-hours re-
flects the observation of longer working hours in developing countries relative to
the developed economies (Lee et al., 2007). It is not difficult to accept the cali-
brated value of fe since, apart from the monetary costs of labor migration which
include visa processing, transportation, initial monthly allowance, emigrants also
face the non-monetized cost of leaving their families behind and adjusting to a
9This group refers to countries with available empirical estimates of labor supply elasticities
(excluding those obtained through OLS estimation for they are known to be inconsistent). These
are estimates pertaining to US, Sweden, Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, UK, and Finland
labor markets.
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new environment. From equation (2.33), ν = SM/SC , where SM is the average
ratio of M1 to GDP from 1988-1999 and SC , the private consumption share of
GDP for the same period. The ν value implies that households hold money bal-
ances equivalent to 45% of their quarterly consumption. On one hand, we treat
νW as the ratio of the Philippine real wage rate to that of the US and use the year
2000 wage rate values of Ashenfelter and Jurajda (2001) who suggest to use the
Big Mac index in comparing wage rates across countries (WF2000 = 2.59 whereas
WD2000 = 0.46). Ideally, the ν
W parameter must also take account of the differ-
ences in the wage measurement and consumption basket, proxied by the nominal
exchange rate. The degree of home bias, a, reflects the chunk of non-traded goods
in the CPI. We could not find data directly corresponding to a and instead calcu-
lated the average share of tradables to GDP (1-a) for the period 1981-1999, using
the sectoral classification of Gonzalez-Soriano (1990). The value for a obtained
is comparable to the Thai average of 54% for the period 1980-1998.
Following Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2001), the value of ψI is chosen such
that the simulated standard deviation of investment matches the observed one.
In the same way, the value of ψRem reflects the correspondence of the simulated
standard deviation of remittances to the data. We further borrow the estimate of
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) for ψD.
The degree of price rigidity in the non-traded sector, governed by ψPN , is set
at 175 following Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2001) where they draw their choice of
ψPN from Sbordone’s (2002) estimate of a linear new Keynesian Phillips curve us-
ing U.S. data. In a Calvo-Yun staggered pricing model, this value of ψPN implies
that firms change their price on average every 9 months, as pointed by Sbordone.
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This is acceptable to the Philippine case as employment contracts for temporary
employees are usually set to an average of 6 months. Meanwhile, the speed of ex-
change rate pass-through, ψPM , is set at 30 to reflect studies that report a high (but
not complete) degree of exchange rate pass-through into imported goods prices
in the Philippines (see Webber, 1999; Sahminan, 2002; Devereux and Yetman,
2010).
We draw from the empirical estimates of Devereux et al. (2006) in pinning
down the parameters associated to the processes of the two exogenous variables.
The authors ran a quaterly VAR system over 1982:Q1 to 2003:Q3 for the US
real interest rate and Asian aggregate terms of trade. They find that there is a
low correlation between the residuals of the two variables and that terms of trade
appears to be more persistent than interest rate. Specifically, world interest rate
and terms of trade, tott ≡ P
∗
Xt
P ∗Mt
, are assumed to follow an AR(1) process of the
form,
ln
(
1 + i∗t
1 + i∗
)
= z1 ln
(
1 + i∗t−1
1 + i∗
)
+ i∗ ,
ln
(
tott
tot
)
= z2 ln
(
tott−1
tot
)
+ tot,
where i∗ and tot are the shocks associated to i∗ and tot, respectively. Finally,
to compute the long run allocations of the endogenous variables in the model, we
impose the calibration restrictions that the steady state external debt is 59.66%
of GDP and that nominal exchange rate at the steady state is equal to unity. The
debt-to-GDP estimate is obtained from a simple average of annual Philippine data
from 1970 to 2004.
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Table 4.1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Description
β 0.985 Discount factor (quarterly real interest rate is (1− β)/β)
%D = %F 0.404 Intensity of habit formation
σD = σF 2.8 Inverse elasticity of consumption
η 3 Disutility of labor
ϕ 4 Inverse elasticity of labor supply
fe 0.40386 Cost of emigration per unit
νW 0.1776 Sets the relationship betweenWDt andWFt
ν 0.4499 Fraction of money held by domestic households
δ 0.025 Quarterly depreciation rate
AN = AX 1 Productivity parameters
α 0.3 Capital share in the non-traded sector
γ 0.7 Capital share in export sector
a 0.5868 Degree of home bias
A 1.9699 A = 1
aa(1−a)1−a
ρ 1 Elasticity of substitution between YNt and TMt
λ 11 Elasticity of substitution across non-traded goods variety
ψD 0.0007 Portfolio adjustment cost parameter
ψI 4.44 Investment adjustment cost parameter
ψRem 0.03284 Remittance adjustment cost parameter
ψPN 175 Price adjustment cost, non-traded sector
ψPM 30 Degree of exchange rate pass-through
αi 0.84 Coefficient of interest rate smoothing
αpiD 1.6 Coefficient of inflation
αS 0.2 Coefficient of nominal exchange rate
αGDP 0.7 Coefficient of output
z1 0.46 Persistence of world interest rate
z2 0.77 Persistence of terms of trade
σi∗ 0.0122 Standard deviation of world interest rate shock
σtot 0.0130 Standard deviation of terms of trade shock
ρi∗,P ∗X 0.042 Correlation between world interest rate and terms of trade
34
Chapter 5
Results and discussion
We first compare the comovements implied by the model to those observed in the
Philippine data. We then examine how this model with labor mobility and remit-
tances differ from a model bereft of these features. After doing so, the model’s
response to various monetary policy regimes are examined and the welfare costs
presented.
5.1 Theoretical and empirical moments of somemacroe-
conomic variables
A comparison of the actual and simulated comovements of some macroeconomic
variables is presented in Table 5.1. Although the model overestimates the volatil-
ity of output and greatly underestimates the volatilities of the real exchange rate
and overseas labor, it captures reasonably well the volatilities of consumption and
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to some extent, inflation, domestic labor and the domestic real wage. Moreover, it
correctly implies that consumption, investment, inflation, trade-balance-to-GDP
ratio, domestic employment and real wage are positively correlated with GDP,
whereas real exchange rate, remittances and labor outflow are counter-cyclical
with GDP. We can, thus, say that the model succeeds qualitatively in replicat-
ing the key cyclical characteristics of these macroeconomic aggregates observable
from the data.
Moreover, the model’s variance decomposition analysis reveals that 30.32% of
the fluctuations in GDP is due to the external interest rate shock whereas 69.68%
can be attributed to shocks coming from the terms of trade. These figures are
consistent with the findings of Mendoza (1995) and Uribe and Yue (2006).
5.2 The baseline model in response to the two shock
processes
This section discusses the model’s responses to transitory shocks to the US real
interest rate and terms of trade and establishes the importance of incorporating ex-
change rate pass-through and the two features of labor migration and remittances
to the standard small open economy model.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the impulse responses of the models to a 1% shock to
the external real interest rate. Figure 5.1 compares the impulse response functions
of the baseline model (with incomplete pass-through and labor migration) to those
of a model with labor migration but complete pass-through. Figure 5.2 presents a
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comparison of the baseline model with the standard small open economy model
without labor mobility and migrant transfers.
A quick glance at the graphs in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 would tell us that the three
models generally respond to the shock in the same way. The difference lies in the
degree of their responses. Overall, households, now with more costly access to
foreign loans and facing a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, scrimp on
domestic consumption and investment, thereby reducing demand for non-traded
goods. The fall in demand, consequently, leads to a decline in the domestic price
index, which implies a depreciation of the real exchange rate. (For the full pass-
through case, the sudden surge in the nominal exchange rate pulls up import prices
in the domestic market which leads to an initial upward tick in domestic CPI and
inflation.) With its increased competitiveness in the world market, the export
sector expands resulting to further trade surplus. The baseline monetary policy
that is a hybrid of domestic inflation, exchange rate and output targeting responds
to the shock by preventing this real exchange rate depreciation and deviation of
output from its steady state level. While the fixed exchange rate prevents the
depreciation of the exchange rate by design, the CPI inflation targeting does so
by stabilizing the exchange rate to prevent inflation to gear away from the target.
In the case of a complete exchange rate pass-through to imported goods prices,
a policy maker cannot stabilize inflation without largely stabilizing the exchange
rate. And so the nominal interest rate has to rise by a significant amount. Thus,
such monetary policy actually ensures that almost the full impact (only slightly
cushioned by the weight on output in the monetary rule) of the external interest
rate shock is passed through to the domestic economy. The eventual rise in the real
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interest rate cripples the economy as manifested by the drop in GDP and the fall in
domestic employment. This result implies that the expansion of the export sector
is unable to compensate for the contraction in the non-traded sector so as to raise
aggregate output. On one hand, the presence of incomplete pass-through makes
it possible for the monetary authority to control inflation without worrying much
on the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. And so the monetary authority
need not raise the nominal interest rate by as much as in the complete pass-through
case. As presented in Figure 1, there is greater real exchange rate depreciation and
a smaller increase in the domestic real interest rate for the delayed pass through
case. The presence of delayed pass through then shields the economy from a
further drop in GDP and domestic employment. The increase in trade balance is
less in this case as the domestic economy’s absorption picks up and exports are
less as households’ resources are channeled to the non-traded sector.
The presence of labor mobility and remittances also alter the degree of the
response of the model’s variables. Figure 5.2 contrasts the baseline model to
the model without these features, all other things equal. Following the flow ear-
lier, the rise in the domestic real exchange rate enhances migrant transfers to the
home economy, thereby faintly relieving households from a decline in total ab-
sorption. This household response is supported by a smaller fall in the demand
for consumption and investment goods resulting to a domestic deflation. Nominal
exchange rate further increases as households’ consumption basket includes im-
ported goods. Despite the improved competitiveness of the traded sector, output in
this sector slightly falls compared to the no labor mobility case as more household
workers supply labor to the foreign market where real wages are higher. Since the
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economy is still sensitive to the surge in the nominal exchange rate to a certain
degree (despite the presence of delayed pass through), the monetary authority re-
sponds by jacking up interest rates. Despite a lower rise in the real interest rate,
GDP drops by a greater amount and aggregate domestic employment plummets
further while foreign-bound labor increases.10 The drop in GDP tells us that mi-
grant transfers are unable to cushion the negative impact of the shock on the do-
mestic economy as labor moves out of the domestic market resulting to a smaller
aggregate output. For example, as much as the export sector wants to take ad-
vantage of the exchange rate depreciation by producing more, it is constrained by
the labor supply in the local economy. Still in Figure 5.2, the domestic real wage
cannot be too low since domestic firms now have to compete with foreign firms in
the labor market. In this model, the exodus of migrant workers sinks the foreign
real wages by a degree greater than the decline in domestic real wages. This is one
limitation of the model - by imposing a relationship between domestic and foreign
real wages, the latter becomes determined by the domestic household’s foreign la-
bor supply, which should not ideally be the case. This weakness can possibly
be remedied by making the foreign wage exogenous and one way to do so is to
model it as a productivity shock from the external economy. Despite the large
drop in foreign real wages, remittances increase as migrant workers cut down on
their consumption having realized that their wage earnings have increased value
in the home country as a result of the real exchange rate depreciation.
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 present the responses of some variables from an unantici-
pated temporary shock to the terms of trade. Focusing attention on Figure 3, the
10The opposing responses of the two types of labor is mainly due to the high substitutability of
the two by model design. It would be interesting as well to incorporate a parameter governing the
substitutability of domestic and foreign labor so as to examine their responses from a shock.
40
Fi
gu
re
5.
1:
Im
pu
ls
e
re
sp
on
se
to
i∗
:C
om
pl
et
e
vs
.i
nc
om
pl
et
e
pa
ss
th
ro
ug
h
fo
ra
m
od
el
w
ith
la
bo
rm
ob
ili
ty
an
d
re
m
itt
an
ce
s
41
Fi
gu
re
5.
2:
Im
pu
ls
e
re
sp
on
se
to
i∗
:A
co
m
pa
ri
so
n
of
th
e
ba
se
lin
e
m
od
el
w
ith
a
m
od
el
w
ith
ou
tl
ab
or
m
ob
ili
ty
an
d
re
m
itt
an
ce
s.
42
Fi
gu
re
5.
3:
Im
pu
ls
e
re
sp
on
se
to
to
t:
C
om
pl
et
e
vs
.i
nc
om
pl
et
e
pa
ss
th
ro
ug
h
fo
ra
m
od
el
w
ith
la
bo
rm
ob
ili
ty
an
d
re
m
itt
an
ce
s
43
Fi
gu
re
5.
4:
Im
pu
ls
e
re
sp
on
se
to
to
t:
A
co
m
pa
ri
so
n
of
th
e
ba
se
lin
e
m
od
el
w
ith
a
m
od
el
w
ith
ou
tl
ab
or
m
ob
ili
ty
an
d
re
m
it-
ta
nc
es
.
44
terms of trade shock, serving as a positive productivity shock to the export sector,
increases tradable output and the sector’s demand for inputs. Thus, this income
effect induces domestic households to increase their consumption and investment
expenditures. With the increased inflow of dollars to the economy, the nominal
exchange rate appreciates. In the case of incomplete pass through, the fall in the
nominal exchange rate leads to an instantaneous drop in import prices, but not
as much as in complete pass-through. This leads to households buying more im-
ported and lesser non-traded goods, as opposed to the complete pass-through case.
The fall in import prices pulls down the domestic CPI resulting to a deflation. The
monetary authority comes into the picture by decreasing nominal interest rates
to stabilize inflation and the nominal exchange rate. The real interest rate shoots
up brought about by the drop in inflation. Expectedly, GDP and domestic em-
ployment grow in both cases with the expansion of the producing sectors. For the
incomplete pass-through, GDP is mainly driven by the growth in the export sector.
Figure 5.4 shows that the appreciation of the real exchange rate dampens the
incentive of migrant workers to send their earnings back to the home country and
instead spend their income on consumption. This leads to a smaller increase in
household absorption that includes imported goods. The decline in the demand for
imported goods pulls down the nominal exchange rate whereas the real exchange
rate appreciates by a smaller degree under labor mobility due to the smaller in-
crease in the demand for imported goods. Output in the export sector further
increases with labor mobility as workers choose to stay in the home country due
to increased domestic productivity. In turn, the outflow of workers decreases,
partly due to the lower nominal exchange rate. The increased domestic supply of
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workers leads to a lower domestic real wage. On the other hand, foreign wage
has to increase by a large amount to attract more workers. The nominal interest
rate drops more significantly with labor mobility due to the decline in the nominal
exchange rate and domestic prices. Finally, GDP rises less with labor migration
due to a decrease in absorption coming from a drop in remittances.
Comparing the responses of GDP and inflation to the two shocks in Figures
5.2 and 5.4, we observe that the presence of labor mobility makes GDP more
vulnerable while domestic inflation less before a real interest rate shock, given a
hybrid flexible inflation targeting regime. Conversely, GDP is less and inflation
more sensitive in the same model before a negative terms of trade shock.
How relevant are the labor migration and remittance dynamics of the model to
the Philippine economy? Tan (2006) attributes this significant outflow of Filipino
labor to, among others, the economy’s poor performance, the country’s market-
based educational system, and the reduction in migration-related risks through
the presence of government-established institutions that protect the rights of the
workers in the destination country. There have also been a number of microecono-
metric studies on labor migration and remittances that focus on the Philippines.
For instance, Choi and Yang (2007) are able to show that migrant transfers are
motivated by changes in Philippine households’ income using rainfall shocks as
instrumental variables for income changes. Their results imply that remittances
serve as insurance for the recipient households, thereby explaining the negative
relationship between GDP and remittances in Table 2. Moreover, Yang (2008)
obtains an estimate of 0.60 for the elasticity of Philippine-peso remittances with
respect to the exchange rate. Indeed, a depreciation of the peso against the mi-
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grant’s currency leads to increases in overseas remittances to the Philippines. At
the macro level, while remittances may drive macroeconomic growth by boosting
national disposable income, they may also bring harm to the economy as inflows
of migrant transfers can fuel inflation, lead to an appreciation of the real exchange
rate that places the traded sector to a disadvantage, and reduce labor market par-
ticipation rates (Catrinescu et al., 2009). In the case of the Philippines, Rodriguez
and Tiongson (2001) find that labor emigration reduces the labor supply of non-
migrant relatives, which translates into lower earnings from the local labor market.
Acosta et al. (2009) also support their findings using data for El Salvador and add
that remittance flows, whether altruistically motivated or not, are channeled more
towards non-tradables by the recipient households providing an incentive for the
non-traded sector to expand, thereby reallocating labor away from the tradable
sector - a phenomenon known as the Dutch disease.
The figures have demonstrated that the presence of labor mobility and its con-
sequent migrant transfers generate a different set of economic decision-making
dynamics from the standard small open economy model. Moreover, since the
results obtained from this section may be conditional on the baseline monetary
policy, it is fitting to explore other monetary rules that can possibly cushion the
impact of these external shocks onto an economy where labor mobility and remit-
tances are important driving forces behind output growth.
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5.3 Comparison of alternative monetary rules
Table 5.2 presents the welfare cost figures associated to the different monetary
rules in the face of the external shocks. Four of the six alternative monetary
regimes in Table 5.2 reveal to cause a gain in welfare relative to the baseline
policy of a hybrid flexible inflation targeting. For instance, households have to
augment their current stream of consumption under the baseline policy by 0.039
percent to experience the same level of welfare with monetary targeting. Stated in
another way, households are willing to give up 0.035 percent of their consumption
stream under the non-traded price inflation targeting to see the baseline policy im-
plemented. On the other hand, the same households have to let go of 0.100 percent
of the nonstochastic steady state baseline consumption to experience export price
targeting as the prevailing monetary policy rule. Thus, positive welfare cost values
imply that households are worse off under the associated regimes. The intuition
behind these results can be inferred from a comparison of the impulse responses
of the models as presented in Figures 5.5 and 5.6.
Let us direct our attention to a deterioration in demand brought about by a real
world interest rate hike. It is apparent from Figure 5.5 that the top five mone-
tary policies generate different responses in non-traded goods prices, non-traded
inflation, CPI, CPI inflation, and money holdings. The fall in non-traded output
places an overall downward pressure on its price except for the case of non-traded
inflation targeting, where the price slightly increases. This is so because of the
10 percent mark-up placed on the price over the marginal cost. Correspondingly,
the slight increase in non-traded sector inflation causes the monetary authority to
raise the nominal interest. Despite the fall in demand for imported goods, prices
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for these goods increase due to the depreciation of the nominal exchange. And so
we see that except for the case of the baseline policy, domestic CPI and inflation
go up. The biggest increase in the CPI inflation, however, comes from non-traded
inflation targeting case. And so the high inflation rate works as a disadvantage to
this monetary policy despite the large increase in GDP. Price-level and inflation
targeting policies, on the other hand, raise the nominal interest rate more than non-
traded inflation and money targeting do and this further causes a slump in income
that ultimately leads to a fall in total output. Meanwhile, the increase in domes-
tic prices pulls up money demand and with a policy of monetary targeting, raises
the nominal interest rate. At the end of the day, despite the decrease in demand
brought about by the domestic interest rate hike, total output increases as pulled
up by the expansion of the traded sector. And even if GDP rises less under mone-
tary targeting relative to non-traded inflation targeting, the initial surge in inflation
is also lower for monetary targeting. And so explains why monetary targeting is
welfare-superior to the other monetary rules. It is important to note, however, that
without the price rigidity in the non-traded and import sectors, monetary target-
ing might not prevail the winner in this horserace and overall results might vary.
Devereux et al. (2006) have shown that under complete pass-through, non-traded
inflation targeting turns out to be the best monetary policy rule over inflation and
exchange rate targeting, whereas inflation targeting is best under incomplete pass-
through.
The welfare ranking obtained here is similar to that of Berger and Wagner
(2006) for a two-country sticky price model exposed to productivity and cost-
push shocks. If the two shocks are equally volatile, they find that monetary tar-
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geting dominates CPI and producer price targeting for varying degrees of price
flexibility. The reason is that these two shocks affect intermediate goods output
and prices in their model and a policy that stabilizes a combination of both would
prove to be welfare-dominant. These authors also find that monetary targeting
prevails to be the best simple rule if cost-push shocks predominate but is defeated
by CPI targeting when productivity shocks are more dominant. As discussed by
Sutherland (2004), policies that give room for price movements to stabilize out-
put would dominate in the presence of cost-push shocks. In this model, however,
price stability, to some extent, is made possible through price rigidity under a
monetary targeting regime and monetary targeting is what causes relative stability
in output. In addition, Senay and Sutherland (2007) find that monetary targeting
is welfare superior to a fixed exchange rate when there is a low degree of elastic-
ity of substitution between non-traded and imported goods. Yet, price targeting
welfare-dominates exchange rate and monetary targeting. They use a model simi-
lar to that of Berger and Wagner (2006) but choose foreign money shocks to drive
the dynamics of the model.
We turn to Figure 5.6 for an explanation of the exchange rate and export price
targeting cases. For a fixed exchange rate regime, the initial increase in the nom-
inal exchange rate is countered by a rise in the nominal interest rate. And so,
household income further deteriorates causing a contraction in the non-traded and
import sectors. Moreover, the expansion of the export sector is unable to com-
pensate for the contraction in the non-traded sector such that aggregate output
collapses to a much lower level compared to the baseline policy. Likewise, peg-
ging the export price requires the monetary authority to raise the policy rate by
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about the same degree as in the fixed-exchange rate case and also leads to a fall in
GDP by about the same level.
How does the ranking differ from one coming from a standard small open
economy model without labor mobility and remittances? It can be deduced from
Table 5.3 that the welfare ranking remains the same with the standard model.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This study has extended the sticky-price small open economy set-up (without en-
trepreneurs) of Devereux et al. (2006) to allow for international labor emigra-
tion of households, thereby making remittances endogenously determined in the
model. With the baseline monetary policy of a Taylor-rule type inflation targeting
with a small weight on the nominal exchange rate, the simulated moments of some
macroeconomic aggregates are broadly consistent with the moments of Philippine
data for the inflation-targeting period 2002:Q1-2009:Q3. Moreover, variance de-
composition analysis of the model reveal results that fairly agree with those in
the literature. A comparison of the impulse response functions of the new set-up
with the standard model reveal that the presence of labor mobility and migrant
transfers in the economy generates different dynamics from the set-up without
these features. We find that, under the baseline monetary policy, additional remit-
tance income of domestic households leads to a decline in output in the face of
an external real interest rate hike. On the other hand, labor outflow and its associ-
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ated overseas workers’ monetary transfers to the domestic household shields the
entire economy from a further drop in GDP brought about by an adverse terms-
of-trade shock. Finally, the calibrated model is used as a theoretical framework to
search for monetary policies that are appropriate to this environment with highly
mobile labor. We find that a flexible exchange rate regime in the form of either
monetary targeting, non-traded inflation, price-level or inflation targeting brings
welfare gains to the economy relative to the baseline monetary policy. In contrast,
fixed exchange rate regimes will make the economy worse off relative to the same
baseline policy. A ranking of the welfare costs reveals that monetary targeting is
welfare-superior to any other policy. It is hypothesized, however, that this result is
highly dependent on the sources of shocks to the system. For instance, adding do-
mestic productivity shocks might alter the welfare ranking of the monetary rules.
Moreover, changing the cash-in-advance constraint motivation of holding money
to one with transactions cost and placing a shock on money velocity may allow
us to examine the impact of monetary targeting on the economy in the event of
a velocity shock. Finally, the welfare ranking of these various monetary policies
is preserved even if one deals with the conventional small open economy model
(one without labor migration and remittances).
The welfare-dominance of monetary targeting, if only for a small margin,
somehow confirms Lim’s 2008 theory that the Philippines’ shift from monetary to
inflation targeting in 2002 has not really brought in a significant positive impact
on the real economy. There is a need then for BSP to further research on ways to
improve the current monetary policy framework.
The model is only an initial attempt to study the impact of labor migration
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and remittance dynamics on a small open economy dynamic general equilibrium
framework. It can be further improved by making foreign wages completely ex-
ogenous so that foreign wages remain unaffected by the inflow of foreign workers
into the foreign economy. Moreover, including cost-push shocks in the model
would allow us to verify whether inflation in the Philippines is a cost-push phe-
nomenon, as stressed by Lim (2008), or not. Also, instead of simply manually
matching the simulated moments to empirical ones, some parameter values may
be determined by minimizing a measure of the distance between the model and
empirical impulse response functions, as practiced in Christiano et al. (2005), to
bring the model closer to the data. Lastly, it remains a challenge to estimate the
welfare gain from labor migration and remittances as the utility functions of the
model with labor migration differ from the model without such channels.
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Appendix A
Model equations
A.1 Solution to the household’s problem
The household’s problem can be summarized by maximizing the following La-
grangean:
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
(CDt − %DCDt−1)1−σD
1− σD +
(CFt − %FCFt−1)1−σF
1− σF
− η (HDt +HFt)
1+ψ
1 + ψ
+ λFt (WFtHFt − CFt −Remitt)
+ λDtQNt
{[
INt
KNt
− ψI
2
(
INt
KNt
− δ
)2]
KNt + (1− δ)KNt −KNt+1
}
+ λDtQXt
{[
IXt
KXt
− ψI
2
(
IXt
KXt
− δ
)2]
KXt + (1− δ)KXt −KXt+1
}
+ λDt
[
WDtHDt +RNtKNt +RXtKXt +Mt−1 + StDt +Bt
+ StRemitt + Tt +Πt − PDt(CDt + INt + IXt)−Mt − StfeWFtHFt
− (1 + i∗t−1)StDt−1 − (1 + it−1)Bt−1 −
ψD
2
PDt(Dt −D)2
− ψREM
2
PDt(Remitt −Remit)2
]
+ λDtζt(Mt − νPDtCDt)
}
.
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The associated first order conditions are:
CDt : (CDt − %DCDt−1)−σD = λDtPDt(1 + νζt)
HDt : η(HDt +HFt)
ϕ = λDtWDt
CFt : (CFt − %FCFt−1)−σF = λFt
HFt : η(HDt +HFt)
ϕ = WFt(λFt − λDtStfe)
Remitt : λFt = λDt(St − ψREMPDt(Remitt −Remit))
assumption : WFt =
1
νW
WDt
PDt
Bt : λDt = β(1 + it)EtλDt+1
Dt : λDt(St − ψDPDt(Dt −D)) = β(1 + i∗t )EtSt+1λDt+1
Mt : βEtλDt+1 = λDt(1− ζt)
INt : QNt
[
1− ψI
(
INt
KNt
− δ
)]
= PDt
IXt : QXt
[
1− ψI
(
IXt
KXt
− δ
)]
= PDt
KNt+1 : QNt = βEt
λDt+1
λDt
{
RNt+1 +QNt+1
[
(1− δ)− ψI
2
(
INt+1
KNt+1
− δ
)2
+ ψI
(
INt+1
KNt+1
− δ
)(
INt+1
KNt+1
)]}
KXt+1 : QXt = βEt
λDt+1
λDt
{
RXt+1 +QXt+1
[
(1− δ)− ψI
2
(
IXt+1
KXt+1
− δ
)2
+ ψI
(
IXt+1
KXt+1
− δ
)(
IXt+1
KXt+1
)]}
A.2 Optimal allocation of consumption expenditures
The optimal non-traded and imported goods consumption bundle can be deter-
mined by minimizing the following expression
PNtCNt + PMtCMt + λt
(
CD −
[
a
1
ρC
ρ−1
ρ
Nt
+ (1− a) 1ρC
ρ−1
ρ
Mt
] ρ
ρ−1
)
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around CNt and CMt at every period, where λ is the lagrange multiplier. Corre-
spondingly, the two first-order conditions
CNt : PNt = λta
1
ρ
(
CNt
CDt
)− 1
ρ
CMt : PMt = λt(1− a)
1
ρ
(
CMt
CDt
)− 1
ρ
can be combined to arrive at the following expression
CMt =
1− a
a
(
PMt
PNt
)−ρ
CNt . (A.1)
The above form can then be substituted intoCDt =
[
a
1
ρC
ρ−1
ρ
Nt
+ (1− a) 1ρC
ρ−1
ρ
Mt
] ρ
ρ−1
to result to the household’s optimal demand for non-traded goods:
CNt = a
(
PNt
PDt
)−ρ
CDt , (A.2)
while taking into account that PDt =
[
aP 1−ρNt + (1− a)P 1−ρMt
] 1
1−ρ . The optimal
demand for imported goods,
CMt = (1− a)
(
PMt
PDt
)−ρ
CDt ,
can be derived by plugging in (A.2) into (A.1).
A.3 Solution to the firms’ problems
A.3.1 Export sector
The firms in this sector have to determine their optimal demands for capital and
labor inputs by maximizing profits. That is, their problem can be restated as
max
{KXt ,HXt}∞t=0
PXtYXt −RXtKXt −WDtHXt s.t. YXt = AXKγXtH1−γXt ,
which when solved will yield (2.20) and (2.21).
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A.3.2 Non-traded sector
Each firm i faces the problem of minimizing
L = RNtKNt(i) +WDtHNt(i) +MCNt(i)
[
YN(i)− ANKNt(i)αHNt(i)1−α
]
over KNt(i) and HNt(i) for every t. Solving this problem results to
RNtKNt(i) = αMCNt(i)YNt(i)
WDtHNt(i) = (1− α)MCNt(i)YNt(i).
Equation (2.23) can be derived by following the steps demonstrated in section A.2.
To determine the price level, firm i has to maximize the following expression
over PNt+k(i) for every k:
Et
∞∑
k=0
Γt,t+k
{
PNt+k(i)
(
PNt+k(i)
PNt+k
)−λ
YNt+k −MCNt+k(i)
(
PNt+k(i)
PNt+k
)−λ
YNt+k
− PDt+k
ψPN
2
(
PNt+k(i)
PNt+k−1(i)
− 1
)2}
Hence, for k = 0 (also applies to any other value of k), the first-order condition
appears as
Γt,t
{
(1− λ)
(
PNt(i)
PNt
)−λ
YNt + λMCNt(i)
PNt(i)
−λ−1
P−λNt
YNt
− PDtψPN
(
PNt(i)
PNt−1(i)
− 1
)
1
PNt−1
}
= − EtΓt,t+1PDt+1ψPN
(
PNt+1(i)
PNt(i)
− 1
)(
PNt+1(i)
PNt(i)
2
)
.
Imposing PNt(i) = PNt and multiplying both sides of the equation by PNt and
1
Γt,t
, the previous equation transforms into
PNt(1− λ)YNt + λMCNtYNt − PDtψPN
(
PNt
PNt−1
− 1
)
PNt
PNt−1
= − ψPNEt
Γt,t+1
Γt,t
PDt+1
(
PNt+1
PNt
− 1
)
PNt+1
PNt
.
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Finally solving for PNt results into equation (2.24).
A.3.3 Import sector
Similar to the firms in the non-traded sector, firms in the import sector solve the
following problem:
max
{PMt+k}
Et
∞∑
k=0
Γt,t+k
{
PMt+k(i)TMt+k(i)− St+kPMt+k(i)TMt+k(i)
− PDt+k
ψPM
2
(
PMt+k(i)
PMt+k−1(i)
− 1
)2}
s.t. TMt+k(i) =
(
PMt+k(i)
PMt+k
)−λ
TMt+k
PMt as expressed in equation (2.25) can be derived accordingly.
A.3.4 Household absorption sector
Identical firms in this sector solve the problem,
max
{YNt ,TMt}∞t=0
PDt
[
a
1
ρY
ρ−1
ρ
Nt
+ (1− a) 1ρT
ρ−1
ρ
Mt
] ρ
ρ−1
− PNtYNt − PMtTMt ,
to yield equations (2.27) and (2.28).
A.4 Deriving the current account equation
The derivation of the current account equation in (2.35) starts from (2.6). Taking
into account the labor market clearing condition in (2.34), the balanced budget
condition: Tt =Mt−Mt−1+(1+it−1)Bt−1−Bt, and dividendsΠt = ΠNt+ΠMt ,
where ΠNt = PNtYNt −RNtKNt −WDtHNt −PDt ψPN2
(
PNt
PNt−1
− 1
)2
and ΠMt =
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PMtTMt − StP ∗MtTMt − PDt
ψPM
2
(
PMt
PMt−1
− 1
)2
, (2.35) transforms into
PDt(CDt + INt + IXt) + (1 + i
∗
t−1)StDt−1 + PDt
ψD
2
(Dt −D)2 + feStWFtHFt
= WDtHXt +RXtKXt + PNtYNt − PDt
ψPN
2
(
PNt
PNt−1
− 1
)2
+ PMtTMt
− StP ∗MtTMt − PDt
ψPM
2
(
PMt
PMt−1
− 1
)2
+ StDt + StRemitt.
Recognizing the zero-profit conditions for the exporting and household absorption
sectors, PXtYXt = RXtKXt+WDtHXt and PDtYt = PNtYNt+PMtTMt , the above
expression further simplifies to
PDt
(
CDt + INt + IXt +
ψD
2
(Dt −D)2 + ψPN
2
(
PNt
PNt−1
− 1
)2
+
ψPM
2
(
PMt
PMt−1
− 1
)2)
+ (1 + i∗t−1)StDt−1 + feStWFtHFt
= PXtYXt + PDtYt − StP ∗MtTMt + StDt + StRemitt.
Yet, it is assumed that Yt = CDt+INt+IXt+
ψD
2
(Dt−D)2+ ψPN2
(
PNt
PNt−1
− 1
)2
+
ψPM
2
(
PMt
PMt−1
− 1
)2
. And so, the current account expression takes the form in
(2.35).
A.5 Cobb-Douglas function as a special form of the
CES function
Suppose Yt =
[
a
1
ρY
ρ−1
ρ
Nt
+ (1− a) 1ρT
ρ−1
ρ
Mt
] ρ
ρ−1
. If ρ = 1, as assumed in this paper,
then Yt = AY aNtT
1−a
Mt
, where A = 1
aa(1−a)1−a .
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Proof:
lnYt =
ρ
ρ− 1 ln
[
a
1
ρY
ρ−1
ρ
Nt
+ (1− a) 1ρT
ρ−1
ρ
Mt
]
lim
ρ→1
lnYt = lim
ρ→1
ln
[
a
1
ρY
ρ−1
ρ
Nt
+ (1− a) 1ρT
ρ−1
ρ
Mt
]
ρ−1
ρ
By L’Hoˆpital’s rule,
lim
ρ→1
lnYt = lim
ρ→1
− 1
ρ2
a
1
ρ Y
ρ−1
ρ
Nt
ln a+ 1
ρ2
a
1
ρ Y
ρ−1
ρ
Nt
lnYNt− 1ρ2 (1−a)
1
ρ T
ρ−1
ρ
Mt
ln(1−a)+ 1
ρ2
(1−a)
1
ρ T
ρ−1
ρ
Mt
lnTMt
a
1
ρ Y
ρ−1
ρ
Nt
+(1−a)
1
ρ T
ρ−1
ρ
Mt
1
ρ2
= lim
ρ→1
−a 1ρY
ρ−1
ρ
Nt
ln a+ a
1
ρY
ρ−1
ρ
Nt
lnYNt − (1− a)
1
ρT
ρ−1
ρ
Mt
ln(1− a) + (1− a) 1ρT
ρ−1
ρ
Mt
lnTMt
a
1
ρY
ρ−1
ρ
Nt
+ (1− a) 1ρT
ρ−1
ρ
Mt
=
−a ln a+ a lnYNt − (1− a) ln(1− a) + (1− a) lnTMt
a+ 1− a
= − ln aa + lnY aNt − ln(1− a)1−a + lnT 1−aMt
= −(ln aa + ln(1− a)1−a) + (lnY aNt + lnT 1−aMt )
= − ln aa(1− a)1−a + lnY aNtT 1−aMt
lim
ρ→1
lnYt = ln
Y aNtT
1−a
Mt
aa(1− a)1−a
And so, Yt = AY aNtT
1−a
Mt
, where A =
1
aa(1− a)1−a .
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Appendix B
Second-order expansion of the
welfare cost measure
A second-order approximation of V a0 , V
b
0 and V
b
H0
yields equilibrium values for
these variables that are functions of the initial state vector x0 and the parameter
σ scaling the standard deviation of the exogenous shocks. And so, if we state
V a0 = V
ac(x0, σ), V b0 = V
bc(x0, σ) and V bH0 = V
bHc(x0, σ), the conditional
welfare cost measure, c, can be re-written as
c = 1−
(
V ac(x0, σ) + V
bHc(x0, σ)
V bc(x0, σ) + V bHc(x0, σ)
) 1
1−σ
.
Inherently, c is a function of x0 and σ, i.e., c = Λc(x0, σ). Taking a second-
order expansion of Λc around σ and evaluating the resulting expression at σ = 0
finally leads to the following conditional welfare cost measure
c ≈ V
bc
σσ(x, 0)− V acσσ(x, 0)
(1− σ)(V bc(x, 0) + V bHc(x, 0))
σ2
2
,
where x denotes the nonstochastic steady state vector that is the same for both
policies a and b (the steps are outlined in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007)).∗
∗Since welfare is characterized conditional on the deterministic steady state vector, only the
first and second order derivatives of Λc with respect to σ are considered. Moreover, in deriving
the welfare cost measure, we acknowledge that V acσ = V
bc
σ = V
bHc
σ = 0, as derived by Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2004).
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Appendix C
Complete set of equilibrium
conditions
1. Remitt = WFtHFt − CFt
2. WFt =
1
νW
WDt
PDt
3. KNt+1 =
[
INt
KNt
− ψI
2
(
INt
KNt
− δ
)2]
KNt + (1− δ)KNt
4. KXt+1 =
[
IXt
KXt
− ψI
2
(
IXt
KXt
− δ
)2]
KXt + (1− δ)KXt
5. λDt =
(CDt−%DCDt−1 )−σD
PDt (1+νζt)
6. η(HDt +HFt)ϕ = λDtWDt
7. (CFt − %FCFt−1)−σF = λDt [St − PDtψRem(Remitt −Remit)]
8. η(HDt +HFt)ϕ = λDtWFt [St(1− fe)− PDtψRem(Remitt −Remit)]
9. StλDt
[
1− PDtψD(Dt−D)
St
]
= β(1 + i∗t )EtλDt+1St+1
10. λDt = β(1 + it)EtλDt+1
11. 1
1−ζt = 1 + it
12. QNt
[
1− ψI
(
INt
KNt
− δ
)]
= PDt
13. QXt
[
1− ψI
(
IXt
KXt
− δ
)]
= PDt
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14. QNt = βEt
λDt+1
λDt
{
RNt+1 +QNt+1
[
(1− δ)
−ψI
2
(
INt+1
KNt+1
− δ
)2
+ ψI
(
INt+1
KNt+1
− δ
)(
INt+1
KNt+1
)]}
15. QXt = βEt
λDt+1
λDt
{
RXt+1 +QXt+1
[
(1− δ)
−ψI
2
(
IXt+1
KXt+1
− δ
)2
+ ψI
(
IXt+1
KXt+1
− δ
)(
IXt+1
KXt+1
)]}
16. YXt = AXK
γ
Xt
H1−γXt
17. RXtKXt = γPXtYXt
18. WDtHXt = (1− γ)PXtYXt
19. PXt = StP ∗Xt
20. PNt =
λ
λ−1MCNt −
ψPN
λ−1
PDt
YNt
PNt
PNt−1
(
PNt
PNt−1
− 1
)
+
ψPN
λ−1Et
[
Γt,t+1
Γt,t
PDt+1
YNt
PNt+1
PNt
(
PNt+1
PNt
− 1
)]
21. PMt =
λ
λ−1StP
∗
Mt
− ψPM
λ−1
PDt
TMt
PMt
PMt−1
(
PMt
PMt−1
− 1
)
+
ψPM
λ−1 Et
[
Γt,t+1
Γt,t
PDt+1
TMt
PMt+1
PMt
(
PMt+1
PMt
− 1
)]
22. Yt = AY aNtT
1−a
Mt
, A = 1
aa(1−a)1−a
23. YNt = a
(
PNt
PDt
)−1
Yt
24. TMt = (1− a)
(
PMt
PDt
)−1
Yt
25. ln
(
1+it
1+i
)
= αpiD ln
(
piDt
piD
)
26. YNt = ANKαNtH
1−α
Nt
27. RNtKNt = αMCNtYNt
28. WDtHNt = (1− α)MCNtYNt
29. Mt = νPDtCDt
30. HDt = HNt +HXt
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31. (1+ i∗t−1)StDt−1+feStWFtHFt = PXtYXt−StP ∗MtTMt+StDt+StRemitt
32. Yt = CDt + INt + IXt +
ψD
2
(Dt −D)2 + ψPM2
(
PMt
PMt−1
− 1
)2
+
ψPN
2
(
PNt
PNt−1
− 1
)2
+ ψRem
2
(Remitt −Remit)2
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Appendix D
Steady state expressions
1. Remit = WFHF − CF
2. WF = 1νW
WD
PD
3. IN = δKN
4. IX = δKX
5. λDPD(1 + νζ) = [CD(1− ρD)]−σD
6. η(HD +HF )ϕ = λDWD
7. [CF (1− ρF )]−σF = λDS
8. η(HD +HF )ϕ = λDWFS(1− fe)
9. 1 = β(1 + i∗)
10. i = i∗
11. 1
1−ζ = 1 + i
12. QN = PD
13. QX = QN
14. RN = QN
(
1−β(1−δ)
β
)
15. RX = RN
16. YX = AXK
γ
XH
1−γ
X
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17. RXKX = γPXYX
18. WDHX = (1− γ)PXYX
19. PX = SP ∗X
20. PN = λλ−1MCN
21. PM = λλ−1S
22. Y = AY aNT
1−a
M
23. YN = a
(
PN
PD
)−1
Y
24. TM = (1− a)
(
PM
PD
)−1
Y
25. YN = ANKαNH
1−α
N
26. RNKN = αMCNYN
27. WDHN = (1− α)MCNYN
28. M = νPDCD
29. HD = HN +HX
30. i∗SD + feSWFHF = PXYX − STM + SRemit
31. Y = CD + IN + IX
Additional equation for GDP:
32. GDP = PNYN+PXYX
PD
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Appendix E
Solving for the steady state solutions
Given some parameter values, we solve for the steady state values of 35 unknowns
given 31 equations and 4 calibration restrictions. The unknowns are Remit,WF ,
HF , CF , IN , KN , IX , KX , HD, PD, ζ , WD, CD, S, fe, i, i∗, QN , RN , QX , RX ,
YX , HX , PX , P ∗X , PN , MCN , PM , Y , YN , TM , HN , M , D, and GDP . The
equations are enumerated below.
1. Remit = WFHF − CF
2. WF = 1νW
WD
PD
3. IN = δKN
4. IX = δKX
5. η(HD +HF )ϕPD(1 + νζ) =WD[CD(1− ρD)]−σD
6. [CF (1− ρF )]−σFPD(1 + νζ) = S[CD(1− ρD)]−σD
7. S = νWPD(1− fe)
8. 1 = β(1 + i∗)
9. i = i∗
10. 1
1−ζ = 1 + i
11. QN = PD
12. QX = QN
13. RN = QN
(
1−β(1−δ)
β
)
78
14. RX = RN
15. YX = AXK
γ
XH
1−γ
X
16. RXKX = γPXYX
17. WDHX = (1− γ)PXYX
18. PX = SP ∗X
19. PN = λλ−1MCN
20. PM = λλ−1S
21. Y = AY aNT
1−a
M
22. YN = a
(
PN
PD
)−1
Y
23. TM = (1− a)
(
PM
PD
)−1
Y
24. YN = ANKαNH
1−α
N
25. RNKN = αMCNYN
26. WDHN = (1− α)MCNYN
27. M = νPDCD
28. HD = HN +HX
29. i∗SD + feSWFHF = PXYX − STM + SRemit
30. Y = CD + IN + IX
31. GDP = PNYN+PXYX
PD
The following are the calibration restrictions:
1. Debt-to-GDP ratio, SD
PDGDP
, is set to a period average of 59.66%.
2. Steady state work-hours, HD, is set to 0.4.
3. Nominal exchange rate, S, is set to unity.
4. Terms of trade denominated in US dollars, P ∗X , is also assumed to be equal
to 1.
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